AF447

Now that I look at the BEA report in light of the Der Spiegel article, it begins to make a little more sense. Just prior to the Captain's return to the cockpit, the PF was in TOGA, commanding nose-up at 35000' with an AoA of >40 deg. This all seems consistent with the pilots not knowing how to hand fly the plane in the absence of valid airspeed indications, exacerbated by the fact that they were very close to the ceiling for the aircraft and so it was only flyable in a very narrow airspeed band and in alternate law without automated stall protection - clear pilot error. Upon his arrival, the Captain apparently recognized the stall and directed throttle to idle and the nose down. Twenty two seconds after his arrival they had "no valid indications" and the throttles were in IDLE. Fifteen seconds after that the PF made pitch down inputs, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid and the stall horn souinded again, i.e., they got above 60 KIAS. These were all the right things, that is they seemed on their way to recovering. So what happened? Were they simply too late because of the big Vs, or did the PF reverse the pitch commands when the horn sounded, or did the programmable stabilizer problem described in the Der Spiegel article override their attempts? Presumably, that is what the BEA is now trying to figure out. Anyhow, they impacted 2 min and 48 sec. after the Captain had returned to the flight deck.

Mike