Spatial Disorientation in the Cockpit

Those of you who have been around SPA for awhile know that I occasionally post something under a title like "MSP Hint of the Month". These started out being a series of short comments on things I had found helpful in flying MSFS, shortcuts, procedures, advice, cautions, etc. As time went on these got longer and more "discursive" (i.e. wordy). Increasingly, however, they came to be about flying and how to fly. For instance, I wrote a long piece on how to use the VNAV capabilites now resident in the more recent PMDG products to execute an RNP approach. That piece began with a definition of an RNP approach - a modern, real-world commercial aviation thing - and then with a tutorial on how you could actually fly such an approach in FSX.

Anyhow, I tend to post things about aviation, as opposed to how-to pieces about computers. In truth, I am far from an expert in either subject, particularly the intricacies of computer software However, I like this hobby because I like learning about things and sharing what I learn. I am not a pilot, although I was in the Air Force (many years ago) and have spent a few hours "flying" ( more like steering) a C-47 around the skies of Southern Alabama and a good deal more time planning, briefing, and controling Air Force flight test missions.

So I am always interested in seeing what the simulator can teach me about flying and, particularly, in comparing what can be learned this way with what pilots actually learn by flying real aircraft.

So, if you have had the patience to follow me this far, I'll come to the point. There is an interesting article in the current number of Aviation Week (which you can see here: aviationweek.com/business-aviation/spati...cockpit-quick-killer) about spatial disorientation of pilots during night flying, or when the pilot otherwise has few or no visual clues about the attitude of his aircraft. Coincidentally, I have just been learning something about just this subject as I have been flying some of Yoland's Alaskan bush flights in the now deteriorating Alaskan fall weather.

I have been flying MSFS for about 13 years and so I have spent quite a few hours flying in IMC, but almost always on autopilot Recently, however, I've been flying the Foundair Bushhawk, a light bush plane with no autopilot. As the weather has been deteriorating in Alaska over the past few weeks, I have found myself flying in IMC, usually under VFR flight rules (illegally, I suppose), and more recently on an IFR clearance. What I have learned is that, if you are flying without autopilot, the minute you enter a cloud you will begin to lose control of the aircraft, particularly if you are trying to do something else at the same time. You will look up at the AI and recognize that you are in a 40 deg bank to the left and losing altitude rapidly. You will then try to correct and end up overcorrecting and find yourself struggling to regain "control" of the aircraft. Of course, sitting in a desk chair in your den, you aren't getting the clues from your inner ear that you would be getting in a real aircraft or in a full motion simulator. So, in those circumstances, you would feel the motion of the aircraft and be aware that you were losing control. However, it turns out that these physiological clues are a mixed blessing at best. That is what the referenced Aviation Week article is about. In fact, this is so true, that the accomplished pilot flies the aircraft strictly off the instruments and ignores what his "seat of the pants" instrumentation is telling him. In other words, he does exactly what the simulator pilot has to do: fly the aircraft using the instruments alone. You will find this surprisingly difficult. It will take your full attention just to maintain heading, altitude and airspeed. The AW article mentions that any distraction, even just turning on the AP, can cause a pilot to lose control. It takes many hours of practice to master this skill. If you read the article, continue down and read the comments appended at the bottom. The fifth comment, by "AvGuide", describes the case of a friend who became a very accomplished IFR pilot by virtue of many hours flying MSFS.

So, once again, we encounter an example of the power and realism of the flight simulator. This is why many professional pilots fly a simulator at home. By reading technical descriptions of commercial aircraft accidents, I have learned that the same mistakes I make flying the simulator are made by professional ATP pilots flying scheduled commercial flights. I read the accident report and think: "yeah, I've done that". Maybe I'll write a little more about that later.

I encourage you to try accomplishing complete flights in the dark or in IMC and to do so without resort to the AP. The AP maintains the heading and altitude of the aircraft without your intervention and thereby creates the impression that this kind of flying is easier than it really is. To make this practice useful, make sure to have your FSX realism settings all on difficult, so that the aerodynamics of the aircraft are more realistic. Also, try to accomplish your flight without using the "P" button. It's a very useful way to answer the question WTF?, but it isn't available in the cockpit. To learn more about the realities of real world flying in GA aircraft, I recommend: "The Killing Zone: How and Why Pilots Die" by Paul A. Craig.

Mike<br /><br /><!-- editby --><br /><br /><em>edited by: Westcoast, Sep 19, 2015 - 09:27 PM</em><!-- end editby -->

Allen,

Yeah, I read a lot about AF447, but I don't think I posted any of it at SPA. I have a file on the subject which is not currently at hand, but here is what I remember. I had my own early theory, which turned out to be part of the final explanation. Like most aircraft accidents, this one was caused by a series of conditions, mistakes, etc. Here are a few that I remember: (1) the young pilot in the left seat had little to no experience hand flying the aircraft at high altitude, (2) When the pitots iced up and the AP disconnected, the pilots failed to recognize that the "standard control law" (or whatever they call it) was no longer intervening between their control inputs and the control surfaces, This control system prevents the pilot from doing anything the aircraft can't, or shouldn't, do. With it gone, you have to know what you're doing, (3) They responded to the contradictory instrument readings by flying the aircraft up into the "coffin corner" where the wing flies only between two specific airspeeds which are very close together and thus they stalled the aircraft. Recovery of a fully stalled swept wing aircraft is a very difficult manuever, requires tens of thousands of feet of lost altitude and usually only presents one opportunity for recovery, (4) the stall alarm goes on just above the wing stall airspeed. but then turns off below a lower airspeed (so that it won't go off on the ground. The aircraft was in such a deep stall that its vertical speed exceeded its forward speed and thus the stall alarm was going on and off and that may have confused the pilots and prevented them from recognizing that they were in a dead stall, (5) The side stick controllers in the Airbus (there are no control yokes) are not slaved together, this meant that the pilot in the right seat and the Captain, upon his return to the cockpit, may have not known that the guy in the left seat had the sidestick full aft almost all the time. You have to put the nose down to recover from a stall, and (the one I caught early), (6) there was no AoA indicator in the cockpit. As a result, the pilots had no direct indication that the angle of attack of the wings was very large (maybe 45 deg. or more), even though the PFD was showing a slight nose up or nose down attitude.

This accident was yet another demonstration (there are many others) that cockpit automation is usually a very good thing, but sometimes a very bad thing. Regardless of the automation of an aircraft, the pilots must be capable of flying it by hand, in all flight regimes, using only the backup steam gauges, and they must practice this skill frequently. This takes a lot of skill and doing it regularly takes a lot of self discipline, but these are the hallmarks of a professional pilot.

Mike

Good description of the Air France tragedy Mike. Truly a confluence of events that overwhelmed the crew.

Also - your recommendation of The Killing Zone is one I concur with - a very interesting read, even for just sim pilots like myself. One of the things that surprised me from that read was the John Kennedy Jr plane crash. I thought initially that he foolishly flew into IFR conditions, yet I believe that book demonstrated how night flying over water and other weather factors can create IFR conditions even though officially considered VFR. While it's true John Jr. took some risks during that flight, it was not the foolhardy flight I originally thought.

There was a good podcast done with Chirs Palmer's Angle of Attack flight program (all are wonderful) where he interviewed the author of "The Killing Zone". That inspired me to read the book.